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91.
The authors consider the optimal amount of insurance purchased by an individual who behaves according to the Hurwicz criterion of choice under uncertainty. Their results are compared with earlier results obtained in alternative frameworks (expected utility maximization and Savage's regret criterion). It is shown that a positive amount deductible is often suboptimal. 相似文献
92.
THOMAS ERIC KILCOLLIN 《The Journal of Finance》1982,37(5):1183-1197
Many financial futures markets allow substitutions for the par grade of security at delivery. Substitutes are deliverable at premiums or discounts—“differences” in commodities parlance—to the futures price. The rule that establishes these differences is called a difference system. This paper characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yield-based difference systems and investigates particular systems in use. The major finding is that currently used difference systems effectively limit deliverable supply in the futures markets and lead to futures prices which understate the cash market price of the par security. 相似文献
93.
Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally. 相似文献
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To increase inward foreign direct investment (FDI), policy makers increasingly resort to the ratification of double taxation treaties (DTTs). However, the effectiveness of DTTs in inducing higher FDI is still open to debate, as the empirical evidence of existing studies is anything but conclusive. In contrast to earlier approaches, we use a largely unpublished dataset on bilateral FDI stocks, covering a much larger and more representative sample of host and source countries. Controlling for standard determinants of FDI and employing various econometric specifications, our results indicate that DTTs do lead to higher FDI stocks and that the effects are substantively important as well. 相似文献
96.
ERIC G. FALKENSTEIN 《The Journal of Finance》1996,51(1):111-135
This investigation of the cross-section of mutual fund equity holdings for the years 1991 and 1992 shows that mutual funds have a significant preference towards stocks with high visibility and low transaction costs, and are averse to stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility. These findings are relevant to theories concerning investor recognition, a potential agency problem in mutual funds, tests of trend-following and herd behavior by mutual funds, and corporate finance. 相似文献
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Abstract. This paper contrasts technical default, debt service default and bankruptcy, and establishes that the valuation effects of their announcements are significant and increasingly severe. We show the events are interrelated. Specifically, we show that technical default is a timely warning of further distress insofar as adverse stock price effects of debt service default are mitigated if preceded by technical default. We find this arises in part because technical default increases the likelihood of further distress. The extent of the mitigation suggests reduced costs of future distress, likely because technical default triggers the early exercise of contractual rights that allow lenders to increase control over the firm. We also evaluate explanations of why debt service default and bankruptcy occur without firms first reporting technical default. Our analysis is based on the small sample of firms for which we can ascertain the terms of debt covenant constraints. Given this limitation, we find that it is not because debt agreements are written with too much covenant slack, nor do we observe material cases of nonreporting of covenant defaults. We conclude that covenants do not always provide warnings of future difficulties. Résumé. Les auteurs établissent la différence entre le manquement technique, le manquement au service de la dette et la faillite et font la preuve que les conséquences de ces indicateurs sur l'évaluation des entreprises sont appréciables et de plus en plus sérieuses. Ils démontrent que ces événements sont reliés entre eux et, plus précisément, que le manquement technique est un avertissement hâtif d'autres difficultés, dans la mesure où les conséquences néfastes du manquement au service de la dette sur le cours des actions sont atténuées si ledit manquement est précédé par un manquement technique. Les auteurs en viennent à la conclusion que cette situation se produit en partie parce que le manquement technique augmente la probabilité d'autres difficultés. L'ampleur de cette atténuation permet de supposer une réduction des coûts associés aux autres difficultés, sans doute parce que le manquement technique déclenche l'exercice anticipé des droits contractuels qui permettent aux bailleurs de fonds de resserrer le contrôle qu'ils exercent sur l'entreprise. Les auteurs évaluent également les facteurs qui expliquent pourquoi une entreprise peut manquer au service de la dette et faire faillite sans faire d'abord état d'un manquement technique. Leur analyse se fonde sur un petit échantillon d'entreprises à l'égard desquelles il est possible de s'assurer des conditions relatives aux contraintes imposées par les clauses restrictives des contrats de prêt. Compte tenu de cette limitation, les auteurs concluent que ce genre de situation n'est pas attribuable au fait que les contrats de prêt comportent des clauses trop permissives et n'observent pas non plus de cas probants de non-divulgation d'information relative au manquement aux clauses restrictives. Ils en déduisent que les clauses restrictives ne préviennent pas toujours les difficultés futures. 相似文献
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